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ABSTRACT 
Electric power systems are made up of many generators, each with varying 
characteristics, including: minimum and maximum generating capacities, start up costs, 
and costs to run.  An independent system operator uses unit-commitment models to 
determine which generating units should be in use at a given time in order to maximize 
the social welfare of electricity use.  Because of the size and complexity of these models 
and the limited time in which to solve them, they are typically solved only to near-
optimality.  Although these near-optimal solutions are similar in terms of overall welfare, 
energy prices and profits to individual generators can vary significantly between these 
solutions.  A unit commitment model was run for one year using varying demand 
elasticities value and optimality gaps. The results show that generator profits do not even 
out over the year and generators can have significant profit differences. Solving closer to 
optimality does not reduce this effect. Average price differences for the year are small, 
but there are a significant number of hours during which the price difference between 
optimal and near-optimal is significant.  
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1.0 Introduction 
In recent years, electric power systems have moved toward a structure in which 
electricity generation, transmission, and distribution assets are owned and operated by 
different entities.  An independent system operator (ISO) is a separate entity, independent 
of any of the stakeholders, that determines generation and transmission schedules that 
maximize the social value of the power system assets (Sioshansi et al. 2008).  The ISO is 
generally charged with social welfare maximization as its objective. Social welfare is 
defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus.  
In order to maximize social welfare the ISO must solve a unit commitment that 
determines which generating units should be used at any given time. This problem is a 
mixed-integer program (MIP), which uses binary variables to represent the on/off nature 
of generator operations. For the power system to work, the total generation must equal 
the demand at every point in time.  Since the demand is constantly changing there must 
also be a reserve of excess generating capacity, which is ready to generate on short notice 
(Borenstein et al. 2002).  Schedules for generators are typically completed a day ahead.  
Since the ISO has a limited timeframe in which to solve its optimization models and 
determine schedules for the following day, the unit commitment problem is typically not 
solved to complete optimality and a near-optimal solution is used instead. Different levels 
of near-optimal solutions exist. The optimality gap or optimality tolerance measures how 
close the near-optimal solution is to the optimal solution. This measurement is the percent 
within the optimal value that the final solution is guaranteed to be within. For example, a 
near optimal solution of 1e-4 means the final integer solution is guaranteed to be within 
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0.01% of the optimal value. The area around the optimal solution is very flat. Thus these 
near-optimal solutions have very little difference in terms of social welfare, but can vary 
significantly in terms of energy prices and profits of individual generators. Previous work 
has focused on modeling only a short amount of time. This project ran a unit commitment 
model for an entire year. The purpose of modeling an entire year is to see if the 
variability in individual days balances over a year or if they build throughout the year. 
Determining if certain types of generators are more prone to variability is another goal. 
The generators have a wide range of costs and operating constraints. In order to examine 
the difference between solving to a near-optimal and an optimal solution, the model is 
optimized using different termination criteria. Energy price and generator profit 
differences between these different cases are compared.   
This research will also examine what effect price-responsive electricity demand 
would have on prices and profits associated with near-optimal unit commitment 
solutions.  For many years economists have claimed benefits of using markets to send 
price signals to market participants and have justified these claims with simple models.  
Yet no one has yet shown whether the prices generated by a unit commitment-driven 
market provide useful signals.  This project will work toward a higher goal of 
determining if restructured markets send these valuable price signals. Prices signal two 
sides of the market: investors and consumers. Prices help investors determine whether to 
build new generation. The generator profit analysis explores this aspect of price signals. 
The other part of price signals is sending informative signs to the consumer. Varying 
elasticity values and looking at prices touches on this aspect. 
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1.1 Literature Review 
Unit commitment is defined as a decision indicating what generating units are to be in 
use at each point during a scheduling horizon. A related activity is economic dispatch, 
which is determining the allocation of the demand for power among generating units in 
operation at any moment in time (Muckstadt et al. 1976). Muckstadt et al. present a unit 
commitment model, which shares many key aspects of the model that is used in this 
experiment. They also demonstrate that there can exist many near-optimal solutions to a 
unit commitment problem (Muckstadt et al. 1976). 
Johnson et al. (1997) examine the implications of these many near- optimal solutions 
in a competitive market setting. They use a test system with a 168-hour planning horizon 
to demonstrate that while near-optimal solutions are very similar in terms of overall 
welfare, they can yield very different profits to individual generators (Johnson et al. 
1997).  They show that solutions with under one-tenth of a percent variability in the total 
system cost can result in aggregate resource profits varying up to six percent. They also 
demonstrate strong dependencies between decisions in successive hours. Overall they 
support a more decentralized approach to unit commitment problems (Johnson et al. 
1997).  
Guan et al. (2003) show that using heuristics to solve a unit commitment problem can 
cause systematic biases against specific market participants.  The paper promotes a 
solution method that combines the general MIP method with the Lagrangian Relaxation 
framework to take advantage of both approaches (Guan et al. 2003).  
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Sioshansi et al. (2008) demonstrate that both Lagrangian relaxation and MIP solution 
methods will yield the same equity issues that Johnson et al. (1997) discuss, when the 
problems are not solved to complete optimality. They also demonstrate that different 
near-optimal solutions can yield very different energy prices, depending on which 
generators are online and marginal in a particular hour.  
2.0 Project Objectives 
The objectives of this project are: 
1.0 Determine the amount prices fluctuate when unit commitment models are not able 
to be solved to complete optimality. 
 1.1 Examine whether demand elasticity reduces price fluctuations. 
2.0 Determine if there are systematic fluctuations in the profits of individual 
generators. 
 2.1 Establish if the profit fluctuations balance over one year. 
The objectives of this project relate to the overall purpose of determining if 
restructured energy markets send valuable price signals, by determining if certain 
characteristics of generators affect their profit differences.  It also relates to the overall 
purpose by examining whether demand elasticity can reduce price and profit fluctuations. 
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3.0 Project Approach 
In order to complete the project objectives, a unit commitment model was developed 
and run, using a year of power system data from the ISO New England electricity market. 
To accomplish the first objective locational marginal prices (LMPs) from the near-
optimal and optimal solutions are examined. Throughout the project three optimality gap 
values are considered: 1e-2, 1e-4 and 1e-6. The LMP is the marginal value of an 
additional unit of electricity (being consumed or produced) at each location that is 
modeled. How the LMP is computed is explained in section 5.0. The difference in price 
in each hour of each day is examined. General statistics about the overall differences for 
the year are examined as well as examining specific outliers and trends. Objective 1.1 is 
accomplished by running the model at a -0.1, -0.2, and -0.3 elasticity values to both near- 
and complete-optimality. These runs are analyzed similarly to the cases without demand 
elasticity.  
The second objective is accomplished by looking at the differences in each individual 
generator’s daily profit. The daily profit differences will be looked at as well as total 
annual profit differences. Generators that have the most significant difference in yearly 
profits will be examined closely. Characteristics of the generators will be examined to see 
if any trends exist in the types of generators which experience the most significant 
difference in profits. 
The following are the specific phases of the project. 
I.   Learning Phase: Learn how to program optimization models in AMPL and 
conduct literature review on pricing in markets with nonconvexities. 
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II. Data Collection: Gather demand data for 2005 from ISO New England, which are 
available from the ISO New England website.  Retail electricity price data for the same 
time period will also be collected from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy 
Information Administration. 
III. Model Formulation Phase: Formulate the unit commitment model used for the 
analysis. This model was presented and approved by the faculty advisor before moving to 
the next phase.  
IV. AMPL Modeling Phase: Build an AMPL model that runs for an entire year, 
solving for a 48 hour time period and keeping the solution for the first 24 hours and then 
rolling forward. The model should be able to run using price-elastic bids. A variety of 
constraints must also be considered in building the model. These constraints are detailed 
in section 4. 
V. Model Run Phase: The various cases are run using optimization software. The 
cases run use either actual 2005 load data, or a price-elastic demand function with a 
demand elasticity of -0.1, -0.2, or -0.3. The models are run with an optimality gap of 
either 1e-2, 1e-4, 1e-6, or 0. Thus a total of 16 different cases with demand and 
optimality criteria are run. The computer run phase will take approximately two weeks.  
VI. Output Analysis: Output from the trials is analyzed using Microsoft Excel.  The 
output focused on was generator profits and LMPs. Specifically, generators that have 
large profit differences between cases will be examined. 
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VII. Report Phase: An oral defense of a draft thesis before a faculty committee was 
completed on May 9th 2011.  A report documenting the research and findings was written 
and submitted to the Knowledge Bank. 
The expected timeline of this project is as follows: Phases I, II and III will be 
completed by the end of the 2010 autumn quarter, phase IV and V will be completed by 
the end of winter quarter 2011, finally phase VI and VII will be completed by the eighth 
week of spring quarter 2011. For a more detailed project timeline see Appendix A for a 
project Gantt chart.  
4.0 Model 
The model used is a basic unit commitment model with ramping constraints, 
minimum-up and -down times, marginal, fixed, and startup costs and reserve 
requirements. The model is intended to be solved as a MIP with a rolling 48-hour 
planning horizon. The model uses 2005 ISO New England data and includes eight 
demand zones, 276 generators, and six transmission lines. The demand data used is 
hourly demand data for each day in 2005. The generator characteristic and power flow 
data are based off of a single day’s data. Therefore a feasible solution is not able to be 
found without relaxing the ramping constraints on eight days through over-generation 
and under-generation variables. In order to limit the amount of time this was done a high 
cost was associated with over-generation or under-generation. Since the variables 
representing over-generation and under-generation are only used for feasible running of 
the model they are not presented in the model formulation in this section of the report. 
The full AMPL program can be viewed in Appendix B.  
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4.1 Variables and Parameters 
There are a variety of variables and parameters used to build the model. The 
parameters relate to network flow (transmission lines), generator capacity, time, demand 
and cost. There are both binary and continuous variables used in the model. Most 
variables relate to the generators and their activity. 
The transmission parameters that needed to be taken into account were the limit on 
the six transmission lines and the amount of input and output on each line from the 
generators and demand in the eight zones.  
The generators each had minimum and maximum generating capacities as well as 
limits on the amount of increase and decrease between each hour (ramping constraints). 
Each generator remains on/off for a minimum amount of time once entering a 
startup/shutdown. There are certain times that each specific generator must run.  
Costs are accrued when a generator is started up and a marginal cost occurs based on 
the amount of electricity produced. Fixed costs for each generator are also present in the 
model. The parameters can be seen in the table 4.1 below. 
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Parameter Meaning 
ࢉ࢏
ࢌ Fixed cost for generator i 
ࢉ࢏
࢓ Marginal cost for generator i 
ࢉ࢏
࢙࢚ࢇ࢚࢘ Startup cost for generator i 
࢓࢏࢔ࢉࢇ࢖࢏ Minimum load of generator i 
࢓ࢇ࢞ࢉࢇ࢖࢏ Maximum load of generator i 
࢓ࢇ࢞ࢊࢋࢉ࢏ Maximum  decrease of generator i 
࢓ࢇ࢞࢏࢔ࢉ࢏ Maximum increase of generator i 
࢓࢏࢔࢕࢔࢏ Minimum on time of generator i 
࢓࢏࢔࢕ࢌࢌ࢏ Minimum off time of generator i 
࢓࢛࢙࢚࢛࢘࢔࢏,࢚ Binary; 1 when generator i must be on in 
hour t 
ࡸࢉ,࢚ Interface limit on each line in each hour 
࢖࢚ࢊࢌࢉ,࢔ Power transfer distribution factor on each 
line for each node 
࢏࢔࢏࢚࢏ Initial number of hours generator i has been 
online (negative means offline) 
࢙࢏
ࢎ࢕࢛࢘ Hour in which a generator starts up due to a 
startup in a previous period 
Table 4.1: Definition of parameters 
The binary variables determine when the generators are in use, when they are started 
up and when the generators shutdown. A set of continuous variables is used to determine 
the amount of generation from each generator.  
The reserve requirements used in this model require that within 10 minutes there is 
enough capacity to cover the largest contingency (the generator producing the most 
electricity). Within 30 minutes there must be enough capacity to cover the two largest 
contingencies (the two generators producing the most electricity). Binary variables are 
used to determine which generator is the largest and the second-largest contingency in 
each hour. Real variables are used to determine the amount of reserve needed within 10 
and 30 minutes.  The variables can be seen in table 4.2 below. 
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Variable  Meaning 
ࢁ࢏,࢚  Binary; 1 when generator i is on hour t 
ࡿ࢏,࢚ Binary; 1 when generator i is started up in 
hour t 
ࡿࢎ࢛࢚ࢊ࢕࢝࢔࢏,࢚ Binary; 1 when generator i is shut down in 
hour t  
ࢉ࢕࢔࢚࢏,࢚
૚  Binary; 1 if generator i is the first 
contingency in hour t 
ࢉ࢕࢔࢚࢏,࢚
૛  Binary; 1 if generator i is the second 
contingency in hour t 
ࢍ࢏,࢚ Amount generated from generator i in hour 
t 
ࡰࢠ,࢚ Demand in each zone in hour t 
࡯࢕࢔࢚࢏࢔ࢍࢋ࢔ࢉ࢚࢟૚ 1
st contingency amount in hour t 
࡯࢕࢔࢚࢏࢔ࢍࢋ࢔ࢉ࢚࢟૛ 2nd contingency amount in hour t 
࢘ࢋ࢙࢏,࢚
૚૙ 10 minute reserves from each generator i in 
each hour t 
࢘ࢋ࢙࢏,࢚
૜૙ 30 minute reserves from each generator i in 
each hour t 
ࡱ࢚,࢔  Net export from each node n in each hour t 
Table 4.2: Definition of variables 
4.2 Objective Function 
The objective is to maximize social welfare. Welfare is defined as the integral of the 
inverse demand function ( ௭ܲ,௧ሺݔሻሻ minus cost. The demand and marginal cost are 
programmed in the model as step functions. 
The objective function stated in mathematical terms is: 
ܯܽݔ  ቌ෍ ෍ න ௭ܲ,௧
஽೥,೟
଴௧௭
ሺݔሻ݀ݔቍ െ ൭෍ ෍ ݃௜,௧
௧௜
כ ܿ௜
௠൱ െ ൭෍ ෍ ௜ܷ,௧
௧௜
כ ܿ௜
௙൱
െ ൭෍ ෍ ݏ௜,௧
௧௜
כ ܿ௜
௦௧௔௥௧൱ 
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4.3 Constraints  
A variety of constraints relating to generators, transmission lines and reserve 
requirements are used to model the system. Below is a list of the constraints used. An 
explanation of the constraints follows. A capital bold M is represents a very large 
number, and varies depending on the specific constraint set. 
݉݅݊ܿܽ݌௜ כ ௜ܷ,௧ ൑  ݃௜,௧  ൑  ݉ܽݔܿܽ݌௜ כ ௜ܷ,௧ (1) 
െ݉ܽݔ݀݁ܿ௜ െ  ࡹ כ ൫1 െ ௜ܷ,௧൯ ൑  ݃௜,௧ െ ݃௜,௧ିଵ (2) 
݃௜,௧ െ ݃௜,௧ିଵ ൑ െ݉ܽݔ݅݊ܿ௜ ൅  ࡹ כ ൫1 െ ௜ܷ,௧ିଵ൯ (3) 
ቀ∑ ݏ௜,௦ 
ሾெ௔௫ ሺଵ,௧ି௠௜௡௢௡೔ାଵሻሿ
௦ ቁ ൑  ௜ܷ,௧ (4) 
ቀ∑ ݏ݄ݑݐ݀݋ݓ݊௜,௦ 
ሾெ௔௫ ሺଵ,௧ି௠௜௡௢௙௙೔ାଵሻሿ
௦ ቁ ൑ 1 െ  ௜ܷ,௧ (5) 
݉ݑݏݐݎݑ݊௜,௧ ൑ ௜ܷ,௧ כ ࡹ (6) 
ݏ݄ݑݐ݀݋ݓ݊௜,௧  ൒  ௜ܷ,௧ିଵ െ ௜ܷ,௧ (7) 
௜ܵ,௧  ൒  ௜ܷ,௧ െ ௜ܷ,௧ିଵ (8) 
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݊݃݁݊ܿݕ௧ଵ ൒ ݃௜,௧ (9) 
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݊݃݁݊ܿݕ௧ଵ െ ݃௜,௧ ൑ ൫1 െ ܿ݋݊ݐ௜,௧
ଵ ൯ כ ࡹ  (10) 
∑ ܿ݋݊ݐ௜,௧
ଵ
௜ ൌ 1 (11) 
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݊݃݁݊ܿݕ௧ଶ ൒ ݃௜,௧ െ ܿ݋݊ݐ௜,௧
ଵ כ ࡹ (12) 
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݊݃݁݊ܿݕ௧ଶ െ ݃௜,௧ ൑ ൫1 െ ܿ݋݊ݐ௜,௧
ଶ ൯ כ ࡹ  (13) 
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∑ ܿ݋݊ݐ௜,௧
ଶ
௜ ൌ 1 (14) 
ݎ݁ݏ௜,௧
ଵ଴ ൑ ൫1 െ ܿ݋݊ݐ௜,௧
ଵ ൯ כ ݉ܽݔ݅݊ܿ௜/6 (15) 
ݎ݁ݏ௜,௧
ଵ଴ ൅ ݎ݁ݏ௜,௧
ଷ଴ ൑ ൫1 െ ܿ݋݊ݐ௜,௧
ଵ െ ܿ݋݊ݐ௜,௧
ଶ ൯ כ ݉ܽݔ݅݊ܿ௜/2 (16) 
൫∑ ݃௜,௧ ൅௜ ݎ݁ݏ௜,௧
ଵ଴൯ െ  ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݊݃݁݊ܿݕ௧ଵ ൒ ∑ ܦ௭,௧௭  (17) 
൫∑ ݃௜,௧ ൅௜ ݎ݁ݏ௜,௧
ଵ଴ ൅ ݎ݁ݏ௜,௧
ଷ଴൯ െ  ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݊݃݁݊ܿݕ௧ଵ െ ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݊݃݁݊ܿݕ௧
ଶ ൒ ∑ ܦ௭,௧௭  (18) 
൫∑ ݃௜,௧௜ כ ݃௜
௟൯ െ ܦ௡,௧
௡ െ ܧ௧,௡ ൌ 0 (19) 
െܮ௖,௧ ൑  ∑ ܧ௧,௡ כ ݌ݐ݀ ௖݂,௡௡ ൑ ܮ௖,௧ (20) 
ܫ݂ ݅݊݅ݐ௜ ൐ 0 & ݅݊݅ݐ௜ ൅ ݐ ൑ ݉݅݊݋݊௜ ݐ݄݁݊ ௜ܷ,௧=1 (21) 
ܫ݂ ݅݊݅ݐ௜ ൏ 0 & ݐ ൑ ݉݅݊݋݂ ௜݂ ൅ ݅݊݅ݐ௜ ݐ݄݁݊ ௜ܷ,௧=1 (22) 
ܫ݂ ݏ௜
௛௢௨௥ ൐ 0 ݐ݄݁݊ ܷ௜,௦೔೓೚ೠೝ ൌ 1 (23) 
The first constraint ensures that when a generator is on its output is between the 
minimum and maximum limits. The next two constraints ensure that the ramping 
limitations are respected. Constraint (2) ensures that a generator does not decrease more 
than its maximum decrease amount between hours. Constraint (3) is formulated similarly 
but ensures that a generator does not increase more than its maximum increase amount 
between hours. The generators must stay on for a minimum amount of time once they 
have been started up, which is enforced by constraint (4). The generators are also 
required to stay off for a certain amount of time once they are shutdown, which is 
enforced by constraint (5). Constraint (6) ensures that generators are forced to be on 
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when they must run, as dictated by the data. Constraint (7) defines a shutdown as 
occurring when a generator is off in an hour and on in the previous hour. Similarly, 
constraint (8) defines a startup as occurring when a generator is on in an hour and off in 
the previous hour.  
The next set of constraints enforces the reserve requirements. Constraints (9) and (12) 
define the size (in MW) of the first and second contingency. Constraint (10) defines the 
generator that generates ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݊݃݁݊ܿݕ௧ଵ as the first contingency, while constraint (11) ensures 
that exactly one generator is the largest contingency. Constraints (13) and (14) similarly 
define the second contingency. Constraints (15) and (16) limit the amount of 10- and 30-
minute reserves that each generator can provide, based on its ramping limit. These 
constraints also ensure that the generators which are the first and second contingency 
cannot provide 10- and 30- minute reserves. Constraints (17) and (18) ensure that the 10- 
and 30-minute reserves provided by all of the generators cover the first and second 
contingencies. Constraint (19) ensures that the load in each zone is exactly met, either by 
local generation or by imports. Constraint (20) imposes the limits on power flows along 
the transmission lines. Constraint (21) and (22) ensures that minimum on time and off 
time are enforced between days. Constraint (23) forces generators to startup if they were 
started up on the previous day.  
5.0 Data Analysis 
The model is programmed in AMPL and solved using cplex. As discussed above, the 
generators’ ramping limits are based off of one day’s data. Therefore over-generation and 
under-generation variables are used to allow these constraints to be relaxed when they 
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must be for feasibility. This only occurs on 8 days: May 14th, May 15th, May 22nd, May 
28th, May 29th, May 30th, October 29th, and October 30th. These days are excluded from 
the data analysis, since the LMPs and other values would be meaningless on these days. 
The LMP is defined as the dual variable of the load balance constraint (19). It is assumed 
that the generator is paid for energy based on the LMP. Therefore generator revenue is 
defined as the LMP corresponding to the location at which the generator is located, 
multiplied by the amount of energy generated by the generator. Profit is defined as 
revenue minus cost, where the costs consist of the three components modeled in the 
objective function. Cases in which a generator has a negative profit for the day, a make-
whole payment is made. This is a supplemental payment given to the generator to ensure 
that no generator operates at a net loss. This make-whole payment mechanism is needed 
because payments based on energy only can leave a generator with negative profits, due 
to the non-convex nature of generator startups (Sioshansi et al, 2008). 
6.0 Results 
The results demonstrate that not solving a unit commitment model to complete 
optimality can affect LMPs and generator profits. Moreover, these discrepancies do not 
necessarily balance over the course of the year. 
6.1 Generator Profit 
All of the near-optimal runs yield differences in generator profits when compared to 
the optimal run. Table 6.1 shows the average, standard deviation, and coefficient of 
variation of the difference in annual profits between near- and completely-optimal model 
runs. An elasticity value of 0 represents case in which the actual 2005 load data is used.  
15 
 
Elasticity 
Optimal 
Compared to Average Std Dev
Coefficient of 
Variation
0 1.E-06 $27,470 $114,522 4.17
0 1.E-04 $47,645 $283,690 5.95
0 1.E-02 $52,319 $216,114 4.13
-0.1 1.E-06 $4,014 $23,736 5.91
-0.1 1.E-04 $12,117 $70,760 5.84
-0.1 1.E-02 $78,462 $290,572 3.70
-0.2 1.E-06 $1,975 $7,499 3.80
-0.2 1.E-04 $16,415 $54,893 3.34
-0.2 1.E-02 $81,990 $304,031 3.71
-0.3 1.E-06 $3,021 $11,071 3.66
-0.3 1.E-04 $20,818 $73,176 3.51
-0.3 1.E-02 $56,590 $209,906 3.71
Table 6.1: Overview Statistics of yearly generator profits 
 The unit commitment solutions yield many generators that have 0 profits for the 
entire year (this either occurs because a generator is never started up or because it exactly 
recovers its costs through energy or make-whole payments). Table 6.2 presents the same 
summary statistics as table 6.1, with generators that receive zero profit in the complete 
optimum removed from the sample. Comparing the two tables shows that the profit 
differences tend to be higher and more variable when these generators are removed from 
the sample.  
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Elasticity 
Optimal 
Compared to Average Std Dev
Coefficient of 
Variation 
# of gen. 
included
0 1.E-06 $53,771 $156,006 2.90 141
0 1.E-04 $93,263 $392,175 4.21 
0 1.E-02 $102,412 $294,237 2.87 
-0.1 1.E-06 $8,864 $34,729 3.92 125
-0.1 1.E-04 $26,754 $103,486 3.87 
-0.1 1.E-02 $173,245 $413,153 2.38 
-0.2 1.E-06 $4,543 $10,871 2.39 120
-0.2 1.E-04 $37,755 $78,428 2.08 
-0.2 1.E-02 $188,577 $439,706 2.33 
-0.3 1.E-06 $7,007 $16,046 2.29 119
-0.3 1.E-04 $48,285 $105,554 2.19 
-0.3 1.E-02 $131,252 $304,632 2.32 
Table 6.2: Overview Statistics of yearly generator profits with generators seeing zero 
profit for the entire year removed. 
  
Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of annual profit differences between the optimal and 
1e-4 case with demand elasticity of 0. The figure shows the distribution of the profit 
differences is unimodal and centered around 0, although there are significant outliers in 
the data as well.  
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Figure 6.1: Histogram of yearly generator profit difference for the case of 0 elasticity and 
optimal compared to 1e-4 with the generators seeing 0 profit for the year removed. 
 
Figure 6.2 further demonstrates the extent of these differences, by showing the 
difference in generator profits as a percentage of profits in the complete-optimal solution. 
 
Figure 6.2: Histogram of percent difference in yearly generator profit difference for 
the case of 0 elasticity and optimal compared to 1e-4 with the generators seeing 0 profit 
for the year removed. 
 
As can be seen in the histogram the outliers have up to a 90,000% difference in profit, 
which is a significant profit difference. While this extreme of a profit difference was not 
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witnessed in all cases a large difference was still seen. Figure 6.3 shows a histogram of 
the percent differences in generator profits between the complete-optimal and a near-
optimal solution with an optimality gap of 1e-2, when the demand elasticity is -0.1. This 
figure does not show as extreme profit differences, but still shows outliers with as high as 
500% difference in profit. Outliers like this are more common amongst the other cases. 
This case again demonstrates a unimodal distribution centered at 0 with extreme outliers. 
 
Figure 6.3: Histogram of percent difference in yearly generator profit difference for 
the case of -0.1 elasticity and optimal compared to 1e-2 with the generators seeing 0 
profit for the year removed. 
 
Generators which have an annual profit difference greater than $100,000 for the case 
of elasticity of 0 and optimal compared to 1e-4 are examined more closely. Table 6.3 
shows the annual profit differences for these generators. These results demonstrate that as 
the model is solved closer to optimal the profit difference for individual generators is not 
necessarily decreased. The table shows the values of near-optimal subtracted from 
optimal, so a negative value means that the profit under the near-optimal solution is 
higher.
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Elasticity 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Optimal - 1.E-06 1.E-04 1.E-02 1.E-06 1.E-04 1.E-02 1.E-06 1.E-04 1.E-02 1.E-06 1.E-04 1.E-02 
UNIT004 $92,061 -$314,670 $54,843 -$40,010 -$246,156 -$580,674 $19,591 $93,730 $249,507 $0 $0 $0 
UNIT070 $456,183 $508,038 $1,023,380 -$6,144 $28,116 $455,237 -$11,886 $84,191 $707,015 -$27,107 $126,975 -$78,401 
UNIT076 $529,127 $443,482 $580,435 -$107,926 -$132,942 $857,253 $12,341 $282,771 $1,597,265 $125,670 $549,308 $1,305,746 
UNIT077 $1,319,345 $1,319,564 $1,967,877 -$84,615 $91,135 $1,650,164 -$34,982 $212,024 $2,042,427 -$34,589 $230,219 $765,645 
UNIT078 $260,394 $150,064 $140,460 -$36,473 -$85,167 $1,111,040 $22,343 $284,683 $1,283,779 -$402 $2,673 $8,890 
UNIT088 -$68,781 -$731,078 -$141,422 -$52,583 -$228,940 -$119,831 $74,900 $448 $79,220 $0 $0 $0 
UNIT090 $200,325 $221,374 $375,956 -$15,012 $43,815 $2,950 -$5,295 -$7,885 $67,463 $49,036 $97,719 $49,826 
UNIT091 $237,836 $246,496 $412,725 -$13,433 $38,935 -$51,433 -$1,718 -$19,952 $51,371 -$828 $5,513 $18,335 
UNIT153 $422,814 $223,705 $162,018 -$54,429 -$144,426 $1,834,767 $38,312 $485,448 $2,160,114 $2,394 $10,463 $24,871 
UNIT224 -$6,744 -$314,497 -$132,302 $8,610 $530 -$52,744 $7,530 -$17,133 -$54,782 -$7,575 $510,202 $423,508 
UNIT225 -$893,676 -$1,274,753 -$716,260 -$9,092 -$21,712 $255,663 $6,517 $77,627 $352,234 -$10,058 $92,513 $286,916 
UNIT227 $195,502 $120,692 $347,802 -$21,061 -$67,578 $1,008,599 $21,693 $242,312 $1,192,379 $0 $0 $0 
UNIT235 $4,510 -$223,355 -$1,333,361 $4,299 -$180,729 -$3,024,998 -$5,161 -$141,922 -$2,411,777 -$435 -$9,661 -$70,455 
UNIT285 -$459,658 -$4,209,027 $1,929,801 $356,401 $1,073,972 $1,208,961 -$62,777 $406,339 $1,851,787 $0 $0 $0 
UNIT329 -$40,165 -$159,010 -$33,101 -$415 $225 $225 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
UNIT375 $194,256 $111,949 $104,784 -$27,209 -$63,535 $828,845 $16,668 $212,376 $957,711 $0 $0 $0 
UNIT377 -$28,800 $287,026 $1,084,672 -$25,505 $26,021 $595,857 -$10,146 $59,937 $595,581 $0 $0 $0 
UNIT379 $96,252 $150,858 $150,858 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
 
Table 6.3: Yearly Profit Difference between optimal and near optimal runs at varying elasticity values for generators with the 
largest difference.
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For example, unit 285 has a $2 million profit difference when the model has an 
optimality gap of 1e-2. If the optimality gap is reduced to 1e-4, this profit difference 
decreases to -$4 million. This gives a $6 million swing in profits between these two sets 
of near-optimal solutions. There are many cases in the table where a generators profit 
difference fluctuates greatly and without trend between cases and this occurs at all 
elasticity values. The lack of pattern in generator profit difference between runs 
demonstrates that solving closer to optimal does not alleviate this issue, unless the 
problem can be solved to complete optimality.  
Of the 18 generators with a profit difference of $100,000 or more, 12 generators had a 
daily or almost daily profit difference throughout the year. Figure 6.4 shows the daily 
profit difference for a subset of the generators with the highest profit differences. This 
figure shows that large profit difference in most cases is caused by a daily profit 
difference; however there are some cases where the profit difference occurs on only a few 
days.  
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Figure 6.4: Yearly Profit Difference between optimal and 1e-4 run at 0 elasticity values for generators with the large difference. 
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The correlation between the different near-optimal runs was computed to statistically 
show that there is no relation between the results, demonstrating that solving closer to 
optimal does not reduce individual generators’ profit differences. Figure 6.5 is a 
scatterplot of the difference between optimal and 1e-6 and 1e-2 in generator yearly 
profits of an elasticity value of -0.2. The difference between optimal and 1e-2 is on the x-
axis and the difference between optimal and 1e-6 is on the y-axis. It is clear from the 
scatterplot that there is no relation between the runs and the regression analysis further 
demonstrates this.  
 
Figure 6.5: Comparison of difference between optimal and 1e-6 and 1e-2 in generator 
yearly profits for elasticity value of -0.2.  
. 
 
 Table 6.4 gives the R2 and P value of these regressions, which further 
demonstrates that there is no correlation.  
Elasticity R2 P value
0 24.2% 0.000
-0.1 0.0% 0.900
-0.2 0.0% 0.922
-0.3 0.0% 0.739
Table 6.4: R-square and P values for regression analysis of generator profit 
differences of optimal compared to 1e-6 and 1e-2 cases.  
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6.2 Generator Profits explanation of results 
The results clearly show that certain generators saw larger profit differences between 
optimal and near-optimal runs than others. Table 6.5 gives some general characteristics of 
the generators with the largest profit differences. The table shows that there is no over-
arching trend to explain why these generators saw larger profit difference.  
Unit 
Name 
Min 
On 
Min 
Off 
Max 
Dec 
Max 
Inc 
Fixed 
Cost Startup Cost 
UNIT004 24 24 300 300 $9,600.00 $53,333.33 
UNIT070 13 7 1440 1440 $0.00 $30,000.00 
UNIT076 24 48 180 180 $0.00 $0.00 
UNIT077 24 48 240 240 $0.00 $0.00 
UNIT078 1 1 300 300 $0.00 $0.00 
UNIT088 8 5 300 300 $0.00 $12,671.33 
UNIT090 14 6 420 420 $0.00 $21,258.53 
UNIT091 14 6 420 420 $0.00 $21,255.67 
UNIT153 24 49 60 60 $0.00 $0.00 
UNIT224 1 1 1500 1500 $0.00 $1,000.00 
UNIT225 8 36 150 150 $0.00 $21,794.67 
UNIT227 24 48 300 300 $0.00 $60,166.24 
UNIT235 1 1 1500 1500 $0.00 $0.00 
UNIT285 1 1 3600 3600 $0.00 $600.00 
UNIT329 1 1 120 120 $582.79 $861.62 
UNIT375 1 1 300 300 $0.00 $0.00 
UNIT377 24 8 180 180 $1,423.00 $108,168.00 
UNIT379 14 8 300 300 $3,445.36 $36,657.27 
Table 6.5: Minimum on time, minimum off time, ramping rates, fixed cost and startup 
costs for generators which saw large profit difference.  
 
 
 While an overall trend in why these generators se a large profit difference does 
not exist, an explanation for their profit difference can be found when looking at them 
individually. For example Unit 77 has very low costs but must remain on for 24 hours 
once started. This unit also has very low ramping rates. Therefore a decision to turn on 
this generator or increase or decrease its generation has a significant effect on its 
production in successive hours. Thus one different commitment or dispatch decision 
between the different cases can affect this generator’s profits in many subsequent hours. 
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Generator 285, on the other hand, must only be on or off for one hour at a time. This type 
of versatility allows many differences between solutions in which the generator is started 
up and turned off. Generator 379, on the other hand, only has differences in its 
commitment and dispatch between the optimal and near optimal solution on a few days. 
This generator has a high start-up cost so on most days when it is used, it receives a 
make-whole payment. However in the optimal solution there are two days during which it 
stays on long enough to make profit whereas in the near-optimal solutions it has no profit. 
These profit differences show that the prices generated by the market can send spurious 
signals regarding what types of generation investors should build. 
6.3 Locational Marginal Price 
The difference in the LMP between the near-optimal and optimal runs is very small in 
most hours. However there are outliers in which the price difference is very significant. 
Table 6.6 shows the average differences between completely and near-optimal model 
runs. 
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Average Std Dev 
Optimal Compared to 1.E-02 1.E-04 1.E-06 1.E-02 1.E-04 1.E-06
Elasticity Zone 
0 CONNECTICUT -0.20 -0.14 -0.13 8.87 9.98 9.42
0 MAINE -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 3.23 2.76 2.75
0 NEMASS 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 3.31 2.82 2.79
0 NEWHAMPSHIRE -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 3.23 2.76 2.75
0 RHODEISLAND -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 3.23 2.76 2.75
0 SEMASS -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 3.23 2.76 2.75
0 VERMONT -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 3.23 2.76 2.75
0 WCMASS -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 3.23 2.76 2.75
-0.1 CONNECTICUT 0.06 0.02 0.03 4.25 2.47 1.28
-0.1 MAINE -0.19 0.01 0.01 1.61 1.15 0.55
-0.1 NEMASS -0.17 0.01 0.00 1.73 1.25 0.62
-0.1 NEWHAMPSHIRE -0.19 0.01 0.01 1.61 1.15 0.55
-0.1 RHODEISLAND -0.19 0.01 0.01 1.61 1.15 0.55
-0.1 SEMASS -0.19 0.01 0.01 1.61 1.15 0.55
-0.1 VERMONT -0.19 0.01 0.01 1.61 1.15 0.55
-0.1 WCMASS -0.19 0.01 0.01 1.61 1.15 0.55
-0.2 CONNECTICUT -0.20 -0.01 0.00 1.98 1.42 0.53
-0.2 MAINE -0.22 -0.05 0.00 1.59 1.13 0.45
-0.2 NEMASS -0.22 -0.05 0.00 1.62 1.15 0.45
-0.2 NEWHAMPSHIRE -0.22 -0.05 0.00 1.59 1.13 0.45
-0.2 RHODEISLAND -0.22 -0.05 0.00 1.59 1.13 0.45
-0.2 SEMASS -0.22 -0.05 0.00 1.59 1.13 0.45
-0.2 VERMONT -0.22 -0.05 0.00 1.59 1.13 0.45
-0.2 WCMASS -0.22 -0.05 0.00 1.59 1.13 0.45
-0.3 CONNECTICUT -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 1.87 1.48 0.96
-0.3 MAINE -0.13 -0.04 0.01 1.38 1.06 0.47
-0.3 NEMASS -0.12 -0.04 0.01 1.47 1.15 0.65
-0.3 NEWHAMPSHIRE -0.13 -0.04 0.01 1.38 1.06 0.47
-0.3 RHODEISLAND -0.13 -0.04 0.01 1.38 1.06 0.47
-0.3 SEMASS -0.13 -0.04 0.01 1.38 1.06 0.47
-0.3 VERMONT -0.13 -0.04 0.01 1.38 1.06 0.47
-0.3 WCMASS -0.13 -0.04 0.01 1.38 1.06 0.47
 
Table 6.6: Yearly average price difference (in $/ megawatt hour) between optimal and 
near optimal run in each zone for all elasticity cases.   
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  The table shows that the price differences average to around twenty cents. This is 
small compared to the average hourly price for the optimal case of $43.95. As previously 
stated, while the average price differences are small there are still cases of significant 
price differences between optimal and near-optimal cases. Figure 6.6 shows hours in 
which the LMP has a difference of $10/MWh. This is for the case of no demand elasticity 
and the optimal solution compared to an optimality gap of 1e-4.  
Figure 6.6: LMP difference between 1e-4 and optimal of greater than 10 for the 0 
elasticity case. 
  
Most of the cases shown in figure 6.7 have a price difference of less than $50/MWh; 
however there are cases in which the price difference is over $400. These extreme price 
differences occur in the Connecticut zone. Figure 6.7 shows absolute LMP differences 
greater than $10/MWh, by time of day.  
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Figure 6.7: LMP difference between 1e-4 and optimal of greater than 10 for the 0 
elasticity case plotted by hour in the day.   
 
As can be seen from the figure above large price differences were most common in 
the afternoon between 3 and 6 pm. Smaller price differences occurred in the night hours 
but at a higher frequency throughout the year. A similar analysis does not reveal a strong 
seasonal trend. The most significant trend in price differences seem to be locational, with 
the Connecticut and Boston zones being more prone to large deviations than the other 
network locations. There are also many days on which all of the zones see the same price 
difference.  
6.4 Make­Whole Payment 
As previously stated the make-whole payment is a supplemental payment made to 
generators at the end of each day on which they have a negative profit. This payment is 
exactly equal to the revenue shortfall, and brings their profit to zero. There is a small 
difference in the total amount of make-whole payments made between all of the runs 
completed. Table 6.7 summarizes the total annual make-whole payments and the average 
per-unit payment.  
 
‐600
‐400
‐200
0
200
400
600
0 5 10 15 20
LM
P 
Pr
ic
e 
D
iff
er
en
ce
LMP Differences by hour
.Z.CONNECTIC
UT
.Z.MAINE
.Z.NEMASSBO
ST
.Z.NEWHAMP
SHIRE
.Z.RHODEISLA
ND
.Z.SEMASS
.Z.VERMONT
.Z.WCMASS
28 
 
Elasticity Solved to Sum Average per unit 
0 Optimal $3,075,027,762 $11,141,405 
0 1.E-06 $3,077,034,833 $11,148,677 
0 1.E-04 $3,064,100,911 $11,101,815 
0 1.E-02 $3,075,231,486 $11,142,143 
-0.1 Optimal $2,990,356,132 $10,834,624 
-0.1 1.E-06 $2,990,091,730 $10,833,666 
-0.1 1.E-04 $2,987,887,030 $10,825,678 
-0.1 1.E-02 $2,977,053,678 $10,786,426 
-0.2 Optimal $2,951,801,037 $10,694,931 
-0.2 1.E-06 $2,951,963,723 $10,695,521 
-0.2 1.E-04 $2,952,985,831 $10,699,224 
-0.2 1.E-02 $2,947,604,035 $10,679,725 
-0.3 Optimal $2,923,643,845 $10,592,912 
-0.3 1.E-06 $2,923,770,412 $10,593,371 
-0.3 1.E-04 $2,924,989,712 $10,597,789 
-0.3 1.E-02 $2,918,977,863 $10,576,007 
Table 6.7: Make whole payment amount for each of the runs completed.   
7.0 Conclusions 
Examining yearly generator profits for each unit shows that generator profit 
differences between optimal and near-optimal runs do not balance over a year. Generator 
profit differences often occur on a daily basis. Solving closer to optimal does not 
necessarily decrease differences in individual generator profits. Therefore if the model is 
not able to be solved to complete optimality it will suffer equity issues. This can have 
significant effect on price signals. Particularly it can affect the information investors are 
using to make decisions. Examining the locational marginal prices in eight zones showed 
variance in price also occurs when not solved to optimal.  
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